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 ARTICLE 
 
HELPING #CHURCHTOO ABUSE VICTIMS HOLD RELIGIOUS 
ENTITIES ACCOUNTABLE IN CIVIL CASES 
 
Peter B. Janci† 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Ending child sex abuse is the most effective action we can take to improve 
the human condition on earth.”‡ I have spent the last thirteen years working 
towards that aspiration—representing hundreds of individuals who were 
sexually abused as children in cases against institutions of trust. Despite 
helping clients attain some significant successes in cases involving other 
institutions of trust, I remain deeply concerned about the epidemic of child 
sexual abuse that has gone largely unaddressed within the Protestant world. 
This problem has continued quietly for decades (and probably centuries).
Through my work, I have seen first-hand the profound and lasting impact 
that child sexual abuse in the church context has on survivors. Though 
imperfect, the moniker of “survivor” 1 is fitting in many ways, as the lives of 
those who have been sexually abused as children are forever marked and 
 
†    PETER B. JANCI is an attorney and Partner at Crew Janci LLP – a law firm advocating for 
victims of sexual abuse in cases against institutions of trust around the country (and 
sometimes beyond). Mr. Janci has had the honor of representing hundreds of survivors of 
sexual violence over more than a decade in practice. He has represented clients in litigation 
against notable religious organizations (i.e., the Catholic Church, the Mormon Church, the 
Seventh-day Adventist Church, etc.), as well as civic organizations (i.e., the Boy Scouts of 
America, Boys and Girls Club, etc.), schools and universities (public and private), and other 
youth-serving organizations. Mr. Janci also regularly litigates against Protestant churches, 
denominations, missionary organizations, and parachurch entities. In 2010, Mr. Janci served 
as part of the Plaintiff’s trial team in Kerry Lewis v. Boy Scouts of America—a child sexual abuse 
trial in Portland, Oregon that resulted in a $19.9 million verdict for the Plaintiff and the release 
of many of the Boy Scouts secret files on known pedophiles. Mr. Janci has regularly appeared 
in local and national media, including in, the New York Times, the Associated Press, the Los 
Angeles Times, and others. Mr. Janci graduated magna cum laude from Wheaton College (IL) 
and took his Juris Doctor cum laude from Northwestern College of Law at Lewis and Clark 
College. Mr. Janci is admitted to practice in Oregon, Washington, and New York. Mr. Janci 
wishes to thank his colleague and law clerk, Zach Pangares (Seattle University School of Law 
JD Candidate 2021), for his assistance with this article. 
‡.   This quote is attributed to advocate Monique Hoeflinger. I was introduced to this quote 
by a tremendous advocate for the eradication of child abuse named Randy Ellison, author of 
BOYS DON’T TELL: ENDING THE SILENCE OF ABUSE (2011). 
1.   Throughout this article I use the terms “survivor” and “victim” largely interchangeably.  
By these terms, unless stated otherwise, I simply mean one who has suffered abuse.  There are 
differing preferences among those who themselves have suffered such abuse. 
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altered—separated into before and after—by the abuse they suffer.2 Sexual 
abuse in the religious context carries with it an overlay of spiritual betrayal 
and attendant unique and complex harms.3 Psychological researchers have 
found that “[t]he brain appears to remember and process betrayal trauma 
differently than other traumas . . . . On top of the direct sinister effects of 
being sexually assaulted by a [member of the clergy], these institutional 
betrayals lay an extra thick, sticky coating of shame, disgust, alienation and 
loss.”4 And the impact of abuse in the church ripples out to victims’ spouses, 
children, families, and community.5  
 
2.   CATE FISHER ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: A RAPID EVIDENCE ASSESSMENT, 
44 (2017) [hereinafter IICSA Report: The Impacts of Child Sexual Abuse] (“[B]eing a victim 
and survivor of CSA [child sexual abuse] is associated with an increased risk of adverse 
outcomes in all areas of victims and survivors’ lives. Additionally, long-term longitudinal 
research suggests that, in many cases, these adverse outcomes are not just experienced over 
the short and medium term [the initial months and years] following abuse, but instead can 
endure over a victim and survivor’s lifetime.”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). As one 
victim of sexual violence recently explained, “Most people say development is linear, but for 
survivors it is cyclic. People grow up, victims grow around: we strengthen around the place of 
hurt, become older and fuller, but the vulnerable core is never gone.” CHANEL MILLER, KNOW 
MY NAME 307 (2019). 
3.   See Joan M. Cook & Jennifer J. Freyd, Why victims of Catholic priests need to hear more 
than confessions, CONVERSATION (Jan. 16, 2019), https://theconversation.com/why-victims-of-
catholic-priests-need-to-hear-more-than-confessions-109866. 
4.   Id. The original quote refers to assault by a “priest.”  This article focuses on abuse in the 
Protestant context, wherein that position is more commonly identified as a “pastor.”  In any 
event, the same underlying dynamic exists. Studies show sexual abuse frequently impacts the 
faith and spirituality of victims.  See, e.g., Victor I. Veith et al, Keeping Faith: The Potential Role 
of a Chaplain to Address the Spiritual Needs of Maltreated Children and Advise Child Abuse 
Multi-Disciplinary Teams, 14 LIBERTY UNIV. L. REV. 351, 355 (2020) (noting that “[i]n a 
qualitative study of thirty-nine forensic interviewers from twenty-two states who had 
conducted more than 42,000 forensic interviews, researchers noted that most of the 
interviewers had encountered children raising spiritual or religious questions during the 
forensic interview or interview process”). Furthermore, “[i]n a review of thirty-four studies 
reporting on a total of 19,090 adult survivors of child maltreatment, scholars noted that most 
studies found abuse damaged the faith of children, often by damaging the victim’s view of and 
relationship with God.” Id. at 356.  
5.   IICSA Report: The Impacts of Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 2, at 82 (“Victims and 
survivors are at increased risk of experiencing issues such as poor relationship stability, 
interpersonal violence and sexual dysfunction . . . . Negative parenting outcomes can also 
manifest as a result of victims and survivors’ internal lack of belief or confidence in their own 
parenting capability. These negative outcomes can be compounded where individuals are also 
suffering from depression.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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Awareness about the abuse epidemic within the Protestant world is 
growing.6 However, while the Protestant church in America often thinks of 
itself (and holds itself out) as “different” or “set apart,” to date, the actions of 
the Church in response to #ChurchToo abuse tell a different story. From my 
vantage point, the internal dynamics at play in large Protestant institutions 
are largely indistinguishable from those of most “secular,” for-profit 
corporations desperately trying to avoid liability.7 When a victim comes 
forward about abuse, many church leaders grab the same tired “defense 
playbook” that ultimately dehumanizes and reinjures the victims, denies the 
truth of the Church’s culpability, and disfigures the soul of the Church. 
The full reality of the sickness in our religious institutions can be difficult 
for the faithful to accept.8 There are still many more who have difficulty 
accepting a much needed “cure”—namely, more civil liability for religious 
organizations. When it comes to the #ChurchToo9 epidemic, while criminal 
prosecutions of predators are important, they are not enough and do little to 
influence the conduct of enabling institutions. Instead, civil liability is 
essential to help quell the epidemic of child sexual abuse in Protestant 
religious institutions. To do the most to help survivors, eradicate abuse in 
religious institutions, and improve our religious institutions, we must 
 
6.   See, e.g., Casey Quackenbush, The Religious Community Is Speaking Out Against Sexual 
Violence With #ChurchToo, TIME (Nov. 22, 2017), https://time.com/5034546/me-too-church-
too-sexual-abuse/. Recent gains in awareness about abuse in the Protestant church are largely 
the result of the dedication and hard work of many courageous survivors and lay advocates, 
including bloggers, who have refused to remain silent. See, e.g., Sarah Stankorb, The Crusading 
Bloggers Exposing Abuse in Protestant Churches, WASH. POST (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/06/03/feature/the-crusading-
bloggers-exposing-sexual-assault-in-protestant-churches/. 
7.   Religious organizations also often invoke the First Amendment as a shield and a sword. 
Properly pled, civil claims for child sexual abuse focus on the conduct of the organization and 
its agents—not the religious organization’s beliefs—and thereby do not run afoul of First 
Amendment protections. See, e.g., Kelly W.G. Clark, Kristian S. Roggendorf & Peter B. Janci, 
Of Compelling Interest: The Intersection of Religious Freedom and Civil Liberty in the Portland 
Priest Sex Abuse Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 481, 512–13, 513 nn.75–76 (2006). 
8.   See Boz Tchividjian, ‘Spotlight’: It’s not just a Catholic problem, RELIGION NEWS SERV. 
(Dec. 7, 2015), https://religionnews.com/2015/12/07/spotlight-its-not-just-a-catholic-
problem/ (“[M]any Protestant leaders who aren’t shy about speaking out on a wide variety of 
spiritual and cultural issues will often refuse to speak out against specific cases of child sexual 
abuse.”). 
9.   See, e.g., Eliza Griswold, Silence Is Not Spiritual: The Evangelical #MeToo Movement, 
NEW YORKER (June 15, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/on-religion/silence-is-not-
spiritual-the-evangelical-metoo-movement; Kerri Miller & Kelly Gordon, Women of Faith: 
The #ChurchToo movement shines a light on sex abuse in evangelicalism, MPR NEWS (June 12, 
2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/06/12/women-of-faith-what-is-the-church-too-
movement. 
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empower victims of child sexual abuse to use the civil justice system to reach 
both the local bodies and the upper echelons of Protestant religious 
institutions. 
Part I of this article will discuss the important and unique intangible and 
tangible benefits that survivors obtain through civil actions against religious 
institutions. As discussed therein, utilizing the tool of civil justice against 
large religious denominations, confederations, and conferences—i.e., the 
entities with the most influence and resources to effect organization-wide 
change—enforces institutional integrity, encourages important reforms, and 
increases public trust and confidence in such institutions.10 Perhaps most 
importantly, the tool of civil justice creates powerful incentives to increase 
the safety of children entrusted to the care of religious institutions now and 
in the future. 
Part II of this article will address the legal theories and approaches that 
survivors and their advocates can use to reach religious institutions through 
civil lawsuits. As discussed in that section, options include taking a broader 
view of traditional torts (such as negligence and fraud), as well as pushing for 
expansions of tort remedies that have thus far only been available in a small 
minority of states (such as vicarious liability of employing organizations for 
the sexual abuse committed by their agents). 
Finally, Part III of this article will briefly discuss whether a viable 
alternative exists that religious organizations could employ to avoid civil 
litigation entirely.  
II. PART I: WHY CIVIL JUSTICE MATTERS IN THE #CHURCHTOO CONTEXT 
Imposing liability on churches and upper echelon religious organizations 
is critically important. As discussed below, access to civil justice provides 
victims both an important venue to be heard and an opportunity for 
meaningful redress. Civil suits also increase transparency and scrutiny for 
religious entities regarding their child protection efforts (and omissions). 
Such transparency and scrutiny lead to reforms and cultural changes within 
churches that increase the safety of children in the church today and in the 
future.  
 
10.   My arguments are not intended to be limited to only church denominations.  They are 
equally applicable to Protestant missionary, educational, and parachurch organizations. For a 
discussion of laws applicable to sexual assault in the university context, see generally, Laura L. 
Dunn, Mutual Is Not Always Equitable: The Misuse of Mutual No Contact Orders in Title IX 
Proceedings Addressing Sexual Misconduct, 14 LIBERTY UNIV. L. REV. 283 (2020).  
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A. Value for Victims: Acknowledgement and Redress 
Any policy analysis regarding child abuse prevention and response 
measures should begin with the consideration: “What is good for victims?”11 
There are many people ready to fight for what is good for a religious 
institution—whether motivated by sectarian pride or the common instinct to 
root for the powerful.12 In contrast, the voice of the victimized and vulnerable 
is too often forgotten or ignored in these discussions.13 
Reaching large religious institutions in civil suits is unabashedly good for 
victims of abuse, providing an important acknowledgment of the multi-
faceted harm they have suffered. On a moral and emotional level, it provides 
an acknowledgment not only that the abuse happened, and the church 
context or setting of the abuse, but also that the abuse is evidence of systemic 
failures by the church itself.14 When an adult in a position of church authority 
 
11.   See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
WITHIN YOUTH-SERVING ORGANIZATIONS: GETTING STARTED ON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
(2007); see also BASYLE TCHIVIDJIAN & SHIRA M. BERKOVITS, THE CHILD SAFEGUARDING POLICY 
GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND MINISTRIES (2017).  
12.   See, e.g., Christine Schiavo, Catholic League accuses Attorney General Shapiro of fanning 
‘flames of contempt’ for the church, MORNING CALL (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc-nws-pa-grand-jury-catholic-league-
20180922-story.html (“In a court filing . . . the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights 
called the recent Pennsylvania grand jury investigation into the sexual abuse of children by 
priests ‘government-sanctioned religion-based targeting’ that ‘violates the rights of 
Catholics.’”) 
13.   See also RACHEL HURCOMBE ET AL., TRUTH PROJECT THEMATIC REPORT: CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE CONTEXT OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 3 (2019) (“The protection of the 
reputation of the religious institution and individual perpetrators at all costs meant victims 
and survivors said they were often disbelieved, discredited and not supported after disclosing 
their experiences of sexual abuse both as children and as adults.”); Emma Green, Why Does 
the Catholic Church Keep Failing on Sexual Abuse?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/sean-omalley-pope-francis-catholic-
church-sex-abuse/582658/ (discussing the challenges the Catholic Church is facing in 
addressing issues of abuse) (“There’s the U.S. bishops’ conference, which, in 
November, could not agree on even a symbolic nod toward the need for 
accountability.”). 
14.   Spotlight (2015) – Stanley Tucci as Mitchell Garabedian, IMDB, 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1895587/characters/nm0001804 (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (As 
the victim’s attorney states in the movie Spotlight—the dramatization about the Boston 
Catholic abuse scandal—“If it takes a village to raise a child, it takes a village to abuse one.”). 
For a discussion about the importance of acknowledgement to the healing of survivors, see 
also generally, Tracy L. Morris PhD, Julie A. Lipovsky PhD & Benjamin E. Saunders, The Role 
of Perpetrator Acknowledgement in Mediating the Impact of Child Sexual Assault: An 
Exploratory Study, 5(3) J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 95, 95–96 (1996) (finding that victims “whose 
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abuses a child, that only occurs as a result of errors and omissions by those 
within the church who have failed to properly and protactively safeguard 
those children.  
The enabling errors and omissions can fall along a spectrum of 
culpability—from ignorance about child protection to willful facilitation or 
cover-up. When a child is abused in connection with a church or religious 
organization, it is of central importance to the victim that his or her suffering 
is acknowledged, not just as a private injury resulting from the personal fall 
of the perpetrator, but also as a failing by the church body and leadership. 
Viewed in this way, civil accountability for the church and 
denomination—including meaningful compensation for the victim—puts 
the Church’s “money where its mouth is.”15 It acknowledges the gravity and 
convergence of the transgressions by both the perpetrator and the church. It 
demonstrates the Church’s sincere recognition of its role in allowing the 
harm, and reaffirms the Church’s solemn duties to protect the vulnerable in 
its care going forward. 
In addition, civil accountability and resulting financial compensation to 
the victim also serve practical (if only partial) restorative functions. Sexual 
abuse has a serious cost for victims—not only psychologically, emotionally, 
and spiritually, but also economically.16 Statistics are staggering: true 
economic losses over a lifetime of a victim are in the hundreds of thousands 
of dollars if not more.17 Civil accountability shifts some burdens of the impact 
of abuse (namely, economic)—the only such impacts that can be shifted—to 
the responsible parties most capable of bearing it.  
While monetary compensation cannot “undo” the abuse or erase its 
effects, it can ease the substantial life-long burden suffered by victims of 
 
perpetrator had not acknowledged [the abuse] . . . were rated higher on symptoms of PTSD 
than were those in the acknowledging group.”). 
15.   Even where most or all compensation to a victim is paid by the liability insurer for a 
religious entity, this still helps the victims and results in increased insurance premiums that 
must be paid by the insured entity.  
16.   IICSA Report: The Impacts of Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 2, at 14 (“CSA has also 
been associated with increased unemployment/time out of the labour market, increased 
receipt of welfare benefits, reduced incomes and greater financial instability.”).  
17.   One Year’s Losses for Child Sexual Abuse in U.S. Top $9 Billion, New Study Suggests, 
JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. PUB. HEALTH (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2018/one-years-losses-for-child-sexual-abuse-
in-us-top-9-billion.html; The Impact of Child Sexual Abuse, DARKNESS TO LIGHT, 
https://www.d2l.org/the-issue/impact/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
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#ChurchToo abuse. It is ignorant at best and dishonestly self-serving at worst 
for churches to cast aspersion on victims for seeking compensation.18  
B. Increased Safety for Children Entrusted to the Church 
Not only does civil accountability help past victims of #ChurchToo abuse, 
it also plays an important role in increasing the safety of those who are 
vulnerable today. Unfortunately, corporations (including nonprofit and 
religious) have a human impulse towards denial when it comes to child sexual 
abuse.19 They often do not want to believe and will not accept that child sexual 
abuse is happening within their organization. Many large youth-serving 
organizations (religious and secular) have refused to proactively and 
voluntarily take meaningful action (and invest resources) to protect 
children.20 In sum, without civil liability, the cold, hard, corporate calculus 
 
18.   For a first-hand account of the stigma that victims of sexual violence face for 
considering monetary compensation, see CHANEL MILLER, KNOW MY NAME 299–300 (2019) 
(“I was tempted to turn down the money entirely, my pride too big. Mostly, I feared the guilt 
and shame and stigma that arrives when any victim receives any sum of money. . . . I’d never 
received a penny from the criminal justice system. . . . Victims receive heat when given any 
sum. Few acknowledge that healing is costly. That we should be allocating more funds for 
victims, for therapy, extra security, potential moving costs, getting back on their feet, buying 
something as simple as court clothes. . . . Preventing assault is so much cheaper than trying to 
address it after the fact.”) (italics in original). 
19.   Joshua Pease, The Sin of Silence, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018), https://www.washingto
npost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/05/31/feature/the-epidemic-of-denial-about-
sexual-abuse-in-the-evangelical-church/.  
20.   Jim Yardley, Abuse by Clergy Is Not Just a Catholic Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/13/us/abuse-by-clergy-is-not-just-a-catholic 
problem.html (Joyce Seelen, a lawyer who has handled fifty cases of clerical abuse said, “In my 
practice, I have not seen institutions taking steps to correct the problem . . . . Every one of the 
churches that we’ve been successful against walked into court and said, ‘We didn’t know, and 
if we had known, we would have done something.’ Over and over and over, what we saw was 
they didn’t know because they didn’t want to know.”); see e.g., Faisal Rashid & Ian Barron, The 
Roman Catholic Church: A Centuries Old History of Awareness of Clerical Child Sexual Abuse 
(from the First to the 19th Century), 27 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 778, 778 (2018) (finding that 
the Catholic Church was aware for centuries about the problem of sexual abuse by clergy, but 
did not implement effective child protection policies or practices and instead “developed a 
culture of secrecy using clandestine organizational management models and institutional 
laws . . . .”). Similarly, although documentation shows that Boy Scouts of America were aware 
of the problem of adult scout leaders sexually abusing boys as early as the 1930s, the Boy Scouts 
did not inform Scouts or otherwise acknowledge this problem or implement any child 
protection training or policies until the 1980s. Compare “Boy Scouts Head Explains ‘Red’ List,” 
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1935, at N4 (explaining that between the inception of the Boy Scouts in 
1910 and 1935, approximately 1,000 scout leaders who had sexually abused boy scouts were 
documented by the Boy Scouts) with The Boy Scouts Youth Protection Timeline, L.A. TIMES 
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reveals that there is some perceived cost (time, economic, reputational, etc.) 
to enacting prevention measures and, historically, there has been little cost 
felt by the organization when a child is victimized in a local church. The lax 
state of child protection efforts in many Protestant churches—coupled with 
significant occurrences of child sexual abuse—suggest that same calculation 
has been run by the upper echelons of many Protestant institutions 
(including denominations, conventions, conferences, and the like). 
Meanwhile, these entities usually possess or have access to a plethora of 
resources and information about how child abuse is occurring in their 
churches as well as the most knowledge about particular vulnerabilities 
within their programs. Such entities also have the most significant 
influence—and usually the most resources—to thoroughly effectuate child 
protection within the broader organization, including at the local church 
level. To allow large religious organizations to shirk liability is to accept that 
children will continue to be sexually abused in the church—and the profound 
rippling effects will continue. 
Civil accountability—i.e., requiring that churches pay for the harm 
allowed—changes the calculation for the benefit of children. Civil lawsuits 
make it more expensive to ignore the problem than it is to work towards 
fixing the problem. Civil lawsuits incentivize protective action in the future, 
even if driven only by the organization’s concern for its bottom line. This 
increases safety for children who are in the church’s care today. As the late, 
great attorney for clergy abuse victims, Kelly W.G. Clark, often said, “[T]o 
the extent that the Catholic Church is a safer place than it was twenty-five 
years ago it’s not because the bishops got the Holy Spirit. It’s because they got 
sued. Over and over and over again.”21  
C. Impact on the Church: Transparency, Reform, and Trust 
Not only does civil accountability help victims and increase safety for the 
vulnerable within the church, but it also improves the health of the Church 
itself—even if the process is painful. 
As referenced above, right now, many large religious organizations are 
engaging in a pattern of systemic denial that has long allowed abuse to 
 
(Aug. 4, 2012), https://documents.latimes.com/boy-scouts-youth-protection-timeline/ 
(noting first acknowledgements of problems of abuse in scouting and first implementation of 
child protection policies in the 1980s).  
21.   Kelly Clark Compares Mormon Adventist And Catholic Clergy Sex Abuse Cases, 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 6, 2009), https://youtu.be/FmiY2nJ1WGw?t=94; see, e.g., Aimee Green, 
Portland case has pushed Boy Scouts to better protect kids from abuse, attorneys say, OREGONIAN 
(Sept. 2, 2010), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2010/09/portland_case_has_pushed_ 
boy_s.html.  
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flourish. The purpose is simple: because legal liability is correlated to the 
control a corporate entity has over a perpetrator or negligent local church, 
large Protestant denominations and similar institutions strategically seek to 
avoid the appearance of the requisite control that would support such 
liability.  In other words, large religious organizations—where the power and 
resources are most concentrated—strategically feign powerlessness over local 
churches and clergy to avoid a finding of civil responsibility for abuse.  
A recent example of this impulse could be observed in the context of the 
Southern Baptist Convention (SBC). As the Houston Chronicle reported in 
advance of the 2019 annual meeting of the Southern Baptist Convention, an 
executive committee debate occurred about abuse prevention measures.22 
One executive committee member was quoted as warning against adopting a 
proposal requiring the SBC conduct inquiries into how their churches handle 
abuse allegations.23 The reasoning for this opposition was essentially that 
taking protective action could weaken the organization’s ability to claim 
powerlessness later in defending lawsuits by victims. This committee 
member was quoted as saying that: “If you have some little child who’s been 
abused by some pastor or whatever, [a lawsuit against the SBC] may be a long 
shot, . . . [b]ut why open [the SBC’s] checking account to that case?”24 
Those taking this approach would have us believe that the SBC has the 
authority to terminate the membership of churches for taking unorthodox 
 
22.   John Tedesco & Robert Downen, Southern Baptist Convention claims no control over 
local churches. But new rules, lawsuit may test that argument, HOUSTON CHRON. (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Southern-Baptist-
Convention-claims-no-control-14416397.php. For a more thorough history of the problem of 
sexual abuse in the Southern Baptist Conference and the response thereto, see also DEE ANN 
MILLER, ENLARGING BOSTON’S SPOTLIGHT: A CALL FOR COURAGE, INTEGRITY, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION (2017). 
23.   Tedesco & Downen, supra note 21. 
24.   Tedesco & Downen, supra note 21. See also Bill Bowden & Francisca Jones, Former 
Arkansas pastor abused boy, says lawsuit; leaders failed to report it, lawyer says, ARK. ONLINE 
(Jan. 4, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2020/jan/04/pastor-abused-
boy-says-lawsuit-20200104/ (quoting Arkansas sexual abuse victims’ attorney Joshua Gillispie 
as saying: “It’s a legal facade, a disingenuous legal facade that they’ve kept up in a very obvious 
way, that these churches are independent. . . . The Convention derives monetary and other 
benefits from these member churches. They do have some degree of supervisory control over 
these churches” and “When leaders don’t take responsibility for the actions under their 
influence and control, change does not occur. In 2020, organizations that tolerate child sex 
abuse and throw their hands in the air . . . those organizations don’t have a place in civilized 
society.”). 
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positions on cultural issues (such as sexual orientation),25 but can do nothing 
to require training or safety protocols to prevent child sexual abuse by its 
ministers.26 
This is just one example of a widespread and commonly used tactic. 
Numerous other large and powerful national youth-serving organizations 
have made hollow claims about their inability to control what happens at the 
local level.27 These “powerlessness” narratives are often fundamentally 
dishonest corporate “shell games.” Most often, these organizations have the 
raw ability and influence to create change if and when they want to.28 Not only 
does this strategic corporate conduct result in failures to intervene to stop 
 
25.   See Jack Jenkins, Southern Baptists Kick Out Gay-Friendly Church, THINKPROGRESS 
(Sept. 24, 2014), https://thinkprogress.org/southern-baptists-kick-out-gay-friendly-church-
169ca3d4e98/ (“[T]he SBC’s highest committee voted unanimously to ‘disfellowship’ — or 
effectively break ties with — New Heart Community Church in La Mirada, California because 
it voted in May to become a ‘third way’ church, or a congregation where members ‘agree to 
disagree’ about homosexuality and not cast judgment on one another. The committee held 
that the church ‘does not presently meet the definition of a cooperating church’ under 
the SBC’s constitution, which outlaws congregations that ‘act to affirm, approve or endorse 
homosexual behavior.’”) (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
26.   But see Robert Downen, Southern Baptists unveil abuse reporting process, but critics say 
it fails to ensure anonymity, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Southern-Baptists-
unvail-abuse-tip-line-don-t-14878683.php (showing that this argument did not win the day at 
the 2019 executive committee meeting and, instead, the SBC executive committee ultimately 
found the power to adopt the credentialing committee); Bowden & Jones, supra note 23 
(quoting a representative for the Arkansas Baptist State Convention as saying: “The suit 
demonstrates a misunderstanding of Baptist church polity. The Convention does not control 
member churches and has no authority to remove a pastor of a local church . . . .”). 
27.   In the author’s experience litigating against large youth organizations, the author has 
repeatedly observed such arguments from organizations including the Boy Scouts of America, 
the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, the Seventh-day Adventist Church, and numerous other 
religious and secular organizations. Compare, e.g., Anderson v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 
589 N.E.2d 892, 893 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (where Boy Scouts of America “argued that [it] did 
not supervise or exercise any control over the day-to-day activities of local scouting units or 
the volunteer adult leaders of these units”) with Doe v. Presiding Bishop of The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, No. 1:09-cv-00351-BLW, 2012 WL 3782454, at *15 (D. Idaho 
Aug. 31, 2012) (finding that “[t]he Boy Scouts of America is a vertically integrated 
organization. The national organization sits at the top. It sets the goals of the national 
organization and standards for local leadership, and relies on the lower levels to implement 
those goals. The lower levels include the local Councils[,] . . . the local scout leaders[,] and 
troop committees. The national Boy Scouts organization controls the local Councils, charging 
them with carrying out the purposes of the Boy Scouts of America at the local level. . . . The 
local Councils are the proverbial ‘boots on the ground.’ As explained by one past BSA 
executive, the local Councils are the ‘eyes and ears’ for the national organization”). 
28.   See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 24. 
342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd   52 5/13/20   7:34 AM
2020]             HELPING #CHURCHTOO ABUSE VICTIMS             327 
 
 
existing abuse, it is also affirmatively creating a more dangerous environment 
by attracting predators who are emboldened because they are aware of gaps 
in the defenses. This allows abuse to flourish in the church.29  
This duplicity and lack of integrity self-inflicts a grave wound on the 
organization itself. For a religious organization claiming to operate on 
spiritual principles, such cynicism and duplicity allows a moral and spiritual 
rot to set in and fester within the church.  
The civil justice system can serve as an effective cure. Civil lawsuits 
provide an important public avenue for transparency regarding the nature 
and scope of the abuse occurring within religious institutions, as well as the 
institutional responses to known abuse and the risks of abuse. The public 
scrutiny attendant to such civil cases increases the accountability of religious 
institutions—both to constituents and the larger public. Leaders of religious 
organizations, which can otherwise be protected within insular and 
sycophantic echo chambers, are forced into a venue where they must explain 
and answer for their conduct before members of the larger community. Such 
scrutiny and resulting public criticism often create significant pressure for 
much-needed reforms—including the aforementioned implementation of 
increased child protection efforts. All of these factors help to reshape the 
culture within religious institutions, which is an important intangible 
component of robust child protection.30 “Sunlight,” as they say, is “the best of 
disinfectants.”31  
In sum, public civil lawsuits reveal and call out dishonest behavior by these 
organizations. Civil justice brings pressure for change to bear and helps clean 
out the rot that flows from dishonesty. It is ultimately a healthy thing—even 
if painful—to require that the Church be held to the standards it espouses 
and align its actions with its stated values. This realignment also begins a slow 
 
29.   See, e.g., Joe Navarro, Why Predators Are Attracted to Careers in the Clergy, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Apr. 20, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/spycatcher/ 
201404/why-predators-are-attracted-careers-in-the-clergy (discussing a list of 15 reasons why 
predators join religious organizations).  
30.   TCHIVIDJIAN & BERKOVITS, THE CHILD SAFEGUARDING POLICY GUIDE FOR CHURCHES 
AND MINISTRIES 2 (“Churches can level the playing field by cultivating a proactive culture of 
protection that prioritizes their children’s safety”).  
31.   LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, Chapter V: What Publicity Can Do at 1, LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS SCH. OF L. LIBR., (originally published Dec. 20, 1913), 
https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeis-collection/other-
peoples-money-chapter-v. 
342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd   53 5/13/20   7:34 AM
328 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
process of earning back the trust of the betrayed and increasing public 
confidence in these institutions.32  
III. PART II: HOW TO BRING CASES 
Given the unique ability of the civil justice system to address the epidemic 
of child sexual abuse in the Protestant church, survivors of #ChurchToo 
abuse need effective advocates to help them navigate that  system. This begs 
the question: how do attorneys effectively hold religious organizations 
accountable? While many theories exist—and there is some variation across 
jurisdictions—the most promising approaches include negligence, fraud, and 
an expanded vicarious liability. 
A.  Negligence 
The most classic and flexible tort—negligence—has always served as 
somewhat of a “catch-all.” It allows a jury to apply the values of the 
community when considering whether conduct by an organization was 
unreasonable under the circumstances and thereby caused harm to another.33  
A common conceptualization of negligence in abuse cases is the focus on 
a negligent response to a known danger of abuse by a particular perpetrator. 
When involving abuse by a church employee or agent, these are often styled 
as claims for “negligent retention” or “negligent supervision.” However, 
advocates for victims of #ChurchToo abuse need to resist narrow issue 
framing that would unnecessarily curtail the liability of churches or 
denominations. For example, corporate defendants (including religious 
organizations) will often frame the question of foreseeability as narrowly as 
possible; i.e., “Did this church know that this particular perpetrator was going 
to abuse this particular victim in this particular way?” Many jurisdictions 
recognize a much broader concept of foreseeability that can encompass the 
type of behavior we see from large religious organizations.34 
 
32.   For more on the concepts of “institutional betrayal” and importance of institutional 
trust, see generally Carly Parnitzke Smith & Jennifer J. Freyd, Institutional Betrayal, 69 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST, no. 6, Sept. 2014, at 575–87.  
33.   “[O]ur legal system has entrusted negligence questions to jurors, inviting them to apply 
community standards.” W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAWS OF TORTS § 37, pp. 
235-37 (5th ed. 1984). 
34.   For cases where foreseeability was found due to prior knowledge, see Fazzolari v. 
Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1338 (Or. 1987) (en banc) (determining that a 
reasonable factfinder could find sexual assault on school grounds to have been a foreseeable 
risk where a woman was reportedly sexually assaulted on the grounds fifteen days earlier and 
there were allegations of other attacks as well. The case recognizes that the concept of 
foreseeability refers to “generalized risks of the type of incidents and injuries that occurred 
 
342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd   54 5/13/20   7:34 AM
2020]             HELPING #CHURCHTOO ABUSE VICTIMS             329 
 
 
A broader conceptualization of negligence begins with the recognition 
that regional or national religious corporations are charged with the 
knowledge of all information known to (or reasonably knowable by) their 
 
rather than predictability of the actual sequence of events.”); Fuhrer v. Gearhart-By-The-Sea, 
Inc., 760 P.2d 874, 877 (Or. 1988) (“There may be specific duties established by statute, status 
or relationship, but the absence of such duties does not insulate a defendant from liability. In 
the absence of a duty arising from a source of that kind, a defendant may be liable for conduct 
which is unreasonable in the circumstances if that conduct results in harm to a plaintiff and 
the risk of harm to the plaintiff or the class of persons to whom the plaintiff belongs was 
foreseeable.”); McLeod v. Grant Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 362–63 (Wash. 1953) 
(en banc) (“The harm which came to appellant was not caused by the direct act or omission of 
the school district, but by the intervening act of third persons. The fact that the danger stems 
from such an intervening act, however, does not of itself exonerate a defendant from 
negligence. If, under the assumed facts, such intervening force is reasonably foreseeable, a 
finding of negligence may be predicated thereon. . . . [T]he question is whether the actual 
harm fell within a general field of danger which should have been anticipated.”) (citations 
omitted); see also Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 281 (N.H. 1995) (“A school may be liable for 
abuse of a student by a school employee outside of school hours where there is a causal 
connection between the particular injury and the fact of employment.”); Edson v. Barre 
Supervisory Union No. 61, 933 A.2d 200, 205 (Vt. 2007) (“[W]here the former Department of 
Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) failed to protect two sisters from their stepfather—
despite several reports of sexual abuse by the girls, school officials, and a babysitter, as well as 
an admission by the stepfather—we determined that SRS had a duty to anticipate the 
continued sexual abuse of the girls and could therefore be held liable for injuries suffered as a 
result of the stepfather’s actions.”) (citing Sabia v. State, 669 A.2d 1187, 1195–96 (Vt. 1995)); 
Sabia v. State, 669 A.2d 1187, 1196 (Vt. 1995) (“[I]n this case a reasonable jury could conclude 
that SRS should have anticipated Laplant’s continued abuse of plaintiffs, and that SRS’s failure 
to assist the girls was one of the proximate causes of the abuse.”); cf. Raleigh v. Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 625, 275 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 1978); Calkins v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36 (N.M. 1990). 
For cases finding liability without an express duty or without prior notice about the particular 
harm-causing agent, see Fuhrer v. Gearhart-By-The-Sea, Inc., 760 P.2d 874, 877-78 (Or. 1988) 
(Personal representative of deceased hotel guest brought action against hotel and state for 
failure to warn of hazards of ocean surf in which guest died while trying to rescue children. 
The court held that “[w]hether negligence involves the commission of a negligent act or the 
taking of no action when the lack of action creates a foreseeable unreasonable risk of harm, 
the analysis should be the same . . . . A defendant may be liable if the defendant can reasonably 
foresee that there is an unreasonable risk of harm, a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
position would warn of the risk, the defendant has a reasonable chance to warn of the risk, the 
defendant does not warn of the risk, and the plaintiff is injured as a result of the failure to 
warn.”); Quadrozzi v. Norcem, Inc., 509 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836–37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) 
(“[T]he employer need not have foreseen the precise act or the exact manner of injury so long 
as the general type of conduct may have been reasonably expected, 
i.e. general foreseeability exists.”); Doe v. Coe, 135 N.E.3d 1, 16 (Ill. 2019) (“[T]o impose a duty 
to supervise, only general foreseeability is required in an employment context . . . . it is 
generally foreseeable that abuse could occur in programs providing adults with unsupervised 
access to children.”) (emphasis added).  
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agents.35 Thus, with a regional or national organization, the “wide-angle” 
view of “notice” looks to what the corporation knows about this type of risk—
that is, all instances of child sexual abuse across the organization—not merely 
red flags about “Pastor Smith” and his interactions with “Jane Doe.” Under 
this type of macro-level negligence, one looks to what the corporation 
learned from various sources or reports from anywhere within its geographic 
reach over a longer period leading up to the abuse—and the larger 
institutional response to that knowledge. 
Reframing the analysis by taking a “wide-angle” or “macro-level” view can 
be very effective. Using this type of approach, I was part of the team that took 
the Boy Scouts of America through a six-week civil negligence trial in 2010.36 
In that case, we looked at what the national youth-serving organization knew. 
Based on its internal records, it knew that over 1,200 individual scout leaders 
were accused of sexually abusing Scouts across the United States between 
1965 and 1985.37 This evidence established the Boy Scouts’ awareness of a 
sustained, systemic, organization-wide problem—child sexual abuse by scout 
leaders—which posed a danger to all individuals in the same class as our 
clients (a Scout).38 The evidence also showed that the organization undertook 
no meaningful protective actions before its scout leader abused our client.39 
That theory and evidence resulted in a $19.9 million verdict for the victim 
 
35.   See Doe v. Or. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 111 P.3d 791, 795 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) 
(“A corporation is not a sentient being and, therefore, cannot know, be aware of, or discover 
anything, except through the agency of its . . . employees, and it generally is charged with 
knowledge of facts that its agents learn within the scope of their employment. . . . [T]he ‘acts’ 
of a corporation constitute the acts of its agents performed within the scope of their work for 
the corporation”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Oregon City Elks, 
520 P.2d 900, 903 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (“Since a corporation is not a natural person, it can, by 
definition, act only through its officers and agents.”). An agent’s knowledge acquired within 
the scope of the agency is often imputed to the principal, regardless of whether the agent 
actually communicates that knowledge to the principal. See, e.g., Hogan v. Alum. Lock Shingle 
Corp., 329 P.2d 271 (Or. 1958); Marian Estates v. Emp’t Dept., 976 P.2d 71 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). 
36.   See Jack Doe 1 v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 280 P.3d 377 (Or. 2012) (popularly known as “Kerry Lewis v. Boy Scouts of America”). 
37.   Id. at 380 (“The trial court conducted a bifurcated trial of Lewis’s claims. During phase 
one, the jury heard evidence related to liability, compensatory damages, and liability for 
punitive damages. During that phase, Lewis offered all 1,247 files into evidence, each file as a 
separate exhibit. Each file apparently contains information related to one alleged perpetrator 
of abuse, not one act of abuse and not one victim of abuse. The court received each file into 
evidence, over BSA’s objections.”). 
38.   WILLIAM BARTON, RECOVERING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES 505–06 (3d ed. 2010).  
39.   Id. at 506–07.  
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(including $18.5 million in punitive damages).40 This same type of 
approach—looking at the wider scope of knowledge and broader course of 
conduct—can be applied to large religious organizations.  
Furthermore, advocates for victims should consider other more specific 
forms of negligent conduct that may have contributed to the abuse the victim 
suffered. Did the denomination fail to implement or enforce adequate 
protective policies (such as mandatory reporting to civil authorities)? Did it 
fail to train its leaders about how to prevent child abuse? Did it fail to educate 
parents and youth about the dangers? The importance of training staff and 
educating children and parents is all the more important because abuse most 
commonly takes place outside of services and often off premises, as 
perpetrators seek to avoid detection or intervention by others.41 The fact that 
the abuse does not take place at the church does not insulate the church from 
liability for this type of negligence. Rather, this pattern of sexually predatory 
behavior is well-known, foreseeable, and must be protected against.42 As one 
expert in the field recently testified: 
[The] purpose of a youth-serving policy on sexual abuse, is 
not to prevent sexual abuse at the facility, in front of other 
kids, or overt and obvious grooming. Self-interest takes care 
of that. It is to prevent [perpetrators] from contacting kids 
outside the service and relying on their status as . . . church 
members or priests or people like that. That’s why . . . those 
 
40.   Jack Doe 1, 280 P.3d at 380 (“At the conclusion of phase one, the jury awarded 
compensatory damages in the amount of $1.4 million and found BSA liable to Lewis for 
punitive damages. At the conclusion of phase two, the jury returned a verdict of over $18 
million in punitive damages.”). 
41.   See JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Nature and Scope of Sexual Abuse of 
Minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the United States 1950–2002 68 (2004), 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youth-protection/upload/the-nature-
and-scope-of-sexual-abuse-of-minors-by-catholic-priests-and-deacons-in-the-united-states-
1950-2002.pdf (Studied and collected information about the nature of the abuse of minors by 
Catholic priests between 1950 and 2002, finding that “[m]any appear to use grooming tactics 
to entice children into complying with the abuse and the abuse frequently occurs in the home 
of the alleged abuser or victim.”); see also id. at 7 (“[A]buse occurred in a variety of locations . . . 
in the priest’s home or the parish residence (40.9%), in the church (16.3%), in the victim’s 
home (12.4%), in a vacation house (10.3%), in school (10.3%), and in a car (9.8%). The abuse 
allegedly occurred in other sites, such as church outings or in a hotel room, in less than 10% 
of the allegations.”); Arthur Denney et al., Child Sexual Abuse in Protestant Church 
Congregations: A Descriptive Analysis of Offense and Offender Characteristics, RELIGIONS (Jan. 
18, 2018), https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/9/1/27/htm#B68-religions-09-00027 (finding 
that 41% of all alleged sexual abuse occurred within the priest’s home). 
42.   See JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 68.   
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kinds of standards are included. It’s not because everything 
happens at the church. It’s that the church . . . has a 
responsibility to set reasonable safety rules that would 
decrease and hopefully, really prevent child sexual abuse by 
any other volunteers or staff members.43 
     Courts in some jurisdictions have expressly recognized the 
responsibilty of Churches to take reasonable steps to prevent off-site 
abuse. For example, in C.J.C. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop of 
Yakima,44 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a church’s special 
relationship with the children of their congregation gave rise to a duty to 
protect the children from foreseeable harm, which may include abuse that 
takes place off of church premises and outside of church-sponsored 
activities. The Supreme Court of Washington found four factors decisive 
in finding the existence of a duty: (1) the special relationship between the 
church and the abuser associated with the church, (2) the special 
relationship between the church and the victims of abuse, (3) the alleged 
knowledge of the risk of harm possessed by the church, and (4) the causal 
connection between the abuser and the church.45 
The court in C.J.C. found that under these circumstances, the church’s 
duty to protect was not limited to on-premises conduct: “[W]e simply do 
not agree with the Church that its duty to take protective action was 
arbitrarily relieved at the church door.”46 The court went on to state, “Where 
a protective special relationship exists, a principal is not free to ignore the 
risk posed by its agents, place such agents into association with vulnerable 
persons it would otherwise be required to protect, and then escape 
liability simply because the harm was accomplished off premises or after 
hours.”47 “[T]he focus is not on the where or when the harm occurred, but 
on whether the Church or its  individual officials negligently caused the 
harm by placing its agent into association with the plaintiffs . . . .”48 This 
approach is consistent with other cases that recognize a duty to prevent 
 
43.   Transcript of Proceedings on Appeal at 641–42, Doe v. First Christian Church of the 
Dalles, (Dec. 12, 2019) (No. 16CV18445) (testimony of Dr. Anna Salter). 
44.   C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop, 985 P.2d 262, 276–77 (Wash. 1999). 
45.   Id. at 275. 
46.   Id.  
47.   Id. 
48.   Id.  
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intentionally inflicted harm where the defendant has a special 
relationship with either the tortfeasor or the victim.49 
B. Fraud and Misrepresentation  
Other “classic” torts can similarly be employed in an expanded way to seek 
redress for clergy sexual abuse in the Protestant church. Fraud and 
misrepresentation claims offer a similar opportunity to impose liability by 
taking a wider-angle view of a regional or national religious organization’s 
knowledge and conduct.  
Borrowing from the “Big Tobacco” cases, some jurisdictions have 
recognized a macro-level theory of “fraud in the air” when it comes to child 
sexual abuse.50 This theory essentially holds that, when an organization 
knows of an ongoing and systemic danger inherent in its organization or 
program, it cannot withhold that information while at the same time assuring 
the participants and the public that the organization is “safe,” “wholesome,” 
or similar; to do so is intentionally deceptive and removes the victim’s (or the 
victim’s parents’) opportunity for self-protection.51 In such a case, it is not 
 
49.   Other cases have held that other institutions of trust can similarly be liable in negligence 
for off-premises abuse. See, e.g., Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 281 (N.H. 1995) (“Liability 
based on negligent hiring or retention is not limited to abuse that occurs during the school 
day. A school may be liable for abuse of a student by a school employee outside of school hours 
where there is a causal connection between the particular injury and the fact of employment.”); 
Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist., 734 P.2d 1326, 1337–38 (Or. 1987) (noting that school 
district’s special duty of care toward its students extends beyond school hours and campus 
boundaries); N.L. v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 378 P.3d 162, 164, 168 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (holding 
that school district could be liable in negligence for sexual assault of student lured off campus 
by assailant). 
50.   Schwarz v. Philip Morris, Inc. (In re Estate of Schwarz), 135 P.3d 409, 423 (Or. Ct. App. 
2006) (“We hold, based on all of the above evidence, that the jury could reasonably infer that 
defendant engaged in a continuing course of conduct in which it represented to the public that 
it would conduct research and disclose its results to the public over a period of time.”(emphasis 
added)), aff’d sub nom, Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc. (Estate of Schwarz), 235 P.3d 668 (Or. 
2010); Williams v. Philip Morris, 48 P.3d 824, 831–32 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing 
common-law claim of fraud arising out of representations made to the consumer public rather 
than to a specific individual), vacated sub nom, Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 
801 (2003). 
51.   See, e.g., Doe v. Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
No. 1:09-cv-00351-BLW, 2012 WL 3782454, at *5 (D. Idaho Aug. 31, 2012) (“[F]rom the 
beginning, Doe alleged that the Church Defendants failed to disclose the known dangers of 
pedophilic Scoutmasters.”). Regarding eliminating the opportunity for self-protection, see, 
e.g., Doe v. Goff, 716 N.E.2d 323, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (Breslin, J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with majority that scout leader’s sexual abuse of a boy scout was unforeseeable) (“Think about 
it. Each year thousands of young boys wave goodbye to mom and dad and go off to attend 
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necessary that there be intent to defraud any particular person, “but the 
representation must of course have been intended for the public, or for a 
particular class of persons to which the complainant belonged.”52 When an 
unknowing participant reasonably relies on this “fraud in the air” and suffers 
abuse as a result, the deceptive organization can be held liable.  
In some jurisdictions, “[a]ctionable fraud may be committed through the 
concealment of material facts as well as by affirmative and positive 
misrepresentations.”53 Affirmative statements need not be made in order to 
be liable for fraud; silence or concealment of facts can be the basis for a fraud 
action.54 Even representations or statements that are literally true may be 
actionable if the representation creates a false impression under the 
circumstances.55 Fraud can also be based on “proof that the defendant 
concealed a fact concerning relevant behavior of a third party presently 
known to it.”56 
An example of an affirmative statement that may assure participants and 
the public that the organization is “safe” and “wholesome” is the Boy Scout 
Oath.57 Value statements like the Scout Oath are clear, affirmative statements 
about the about the goals, standards, and characteristics embodied by the 
organization and its members. Where such statements are knowingly held 
out to the public even though the person or entity making the statements 
 
remote boy scout outings . . . . [N]o phone, no parents, no police, no teachers, none of the 
usual safety nets. Just the birds and the bears and the Boy Scout leaders. If that is not a 
description of taking custody so as to deprive one of normal opportunities of protection, I do 
not know what is.”). 
52.   Schwarz, 135 P.3d at 423 (“We hold, based on all of the above evidence, that the jury 
could reasonably infer that defendant engaged in a continuing course of conduct in which it 
represented to the public that it would conduct research and disclose its results to the public 
over a period of time.”) (emphasis added); Williams, 48 P.3d at 831–32 (recognizing common-
law claim of fraud arising out of representations made to the consumer public rather than to 
a specific individual).  
53.   Ogan v. Ellison, 682 P.2d 760, 765 (Or. 1984) (quoting Musgrave v. Lucas, 238 P.2d 
780, 784 (Or. 1951)).  
54.   Whitlatch v. Bertagnolli, 609 P.2d 902, 905 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). 
55.   Sheets v. B & B Pers. Sys., 475 P.2d 968, 972 (Or. 1970) (“Fraud may be predicated upon 
an equivocal, evasive or misleading answer calculated to convey a false impression even 
though it may be literally true . . . .”) (quoting Dahl v. Crain, 237 P.2d 939, 947 (Or. 1951)).  
56.   Caldwell v. Pop’s Homes, Inc., 634 P.2d 471, 477 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
57.   Mission & Vision, BOY SCOUTS OF AM., https://www.scouting.org/legal/mission/ (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2020) (“The mission of the Boy Scouts of America is to prepare young people 
to make ethical and moral choices over their lifetimes by instilling in them the values of the 
Scout Oath and Law.”) (emphasis added).  The Scout Oath provides: “On my honor I will do 
my best to do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; to help other people 
at all times; to keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight.” Id. 
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knows (or should know) that they were false, a court may find an actionable 
misrepresentation.58 
Similarly, organizations can be liable in fraud for their silence under some 
circumstances. For example, many jurisdictions hold that concealment, 
including omissions and half-truths, can support an actionable claim for 
fraud:59  
To communicate a representation, it is not necessary that the 
party should speak words or write a message. The desired 
result may be accomplished ofttimes by conduct. Indeed, the 
tongue and the pen are only two of the numerous means of 
transmitting messages. The buoy in the harbor tells the 
navigator of the hidden rock, or shoal, without the use of pen 
or tongue; the lighthouse silently services its purpose. One 
who draws a check upon a bank represents thereby that he 
has a deposit to meet the demand. Paul Revere and his 
lantern needed no words to supplement the message which 
was conveyed to all who saw.60 
Typically, silence can support a fraud claim under two theories: (1) active 
concealment and (2) non-disclosure. An affirmative, fraudulent 
representation can take the form of active concealment. Concealment does 
not require a duty to disclose and is not limited to situations where the 
speaker made a statement that, absent disclosure of material facts, was 
misleading to the listener.61 Such concealment can be accomplished through 
 
58.   See, e.g., Doe v. Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
No. 1:09-cv-00351-BLW, 2012 WL 3782454, at *4–5 (D. Idaho Aug. 31, 2012). 
59.   See Whitlatch v. Bertagnolli, 609 P.2d 902, 905 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that 
affirmative statements need not be made in order for a person to be liable for fraud and that 
silence or concealment of facts can be the basis for a fraud action) (citing Millikin v. Green, 
583 P.2d 548 (Or. 1978); Musgrave v. Lucas, 238 P.2d 780 (Or. 1951)). Even representations 
or statements that are literally true may be actionable if the representation creates a false 
impression under the circumstances. Sheets v. B & B Pers. Sys. of Or., Inc., 475 P.2d 968, 972 
(Or. 1970) (quoting Dahl, 237 P.2d at 947) (“Fraud may be predicated upon an equivocal, 
evasive or misleading answer calculated to convey a false impression even though it may be 
literally true . . . .”)). Fraud can also be based on “proof that the defendant concealed a fact 
concerning relevant behavior of a third party presently known to it.” Caldwell, 634 P.2d at 477. 
60.   Pennebaker v. Kimble, 269 P. 981, 984 (Or. 1928); see also Williams v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 832 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Pennebaker, 269 P. at 984). 
61.   Paul v. Kelley, 599 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 550–51) (noting that where fraud is based on actual concealment, as opposed to 
simple non-disclosure, a duty to speak is not required) (emphasis added). 
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words or acts which create a false impression [and thereby] 
cover[] up the truth . . . or which remove an opportunity 
that might otherwise have led to the discovery of a material 
fact . . . [such as] sending one who is in search of 
information in a direction where it cannot be 
obtained . . . [or] a false denial of knowledge by one in 
possession of the facts.62  
“Non-disclosure,” on the other hand, is an affirmative misrepresentation 
where a duty to disclose arises.63 A “nondisclosure of material facts can be a 
form of misrepresentation where the defendant has made representations 
which would be misleading without full disclosure.”64 Actionable fraud may lie 
where the parties were in a fiduciary or special relationship at the time the 
failure to disclose took place.65 A fraud claim may also be supported by a 
speaker’s failure to disclose information in circumstances in which a 
reasonable person would expect a full disclosure of facts.66 For example, a 
duty to disclose will arise where a speaker acquires information that would 
make a previous representation untrue or misleading and fails to correct the 
previous statement.67 As with any representation, a church or denomination 
has a duty to disclose any facts that, absent disclosure, might make its 
representations misleading.68 
If a church induces parents and youth into a relationship whereby youth 
leaders were entrusted with the unsupervised care of children and the church 
also possessed knowledge about a history or problem of child sexual abuse 
within the church, a reasonable jury could find that the church failed to 
 
62.   Id. at 1238–39 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 106 (4th ed. 1979)) (third 
and sixth alterations are partially in original). 
63.   See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Fought, 630 P.2d 337, 346 (Or. 1981). 
64.   Elizaga v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc., 487 P.2d 870, 873 (Or. 1971) (en banc) (emphasis 
added) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 101 (3d ed. 1964)). 
65.   E.g., Gardner v. First Escrow Corp., 696 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (“Fraud 
may be predicated on a failure to disclose material facts when the parties have a fiduciary 
relationship.”). 
66.   See Heverly v. Kirkendall, 478 P.2d 381, 382 (Or. 1970) (citing Prosser, supra note 61, 
at § 101) (“Misrepresentation may be made by statements which are literally true but under 
the circumstances create a false impression.”). 
67.   See, e.g., Millikin v. Green, 583 P.2d 548, 550 (Or. 1978). 
68.   See, e.g., Meade v. Cedarapids, Inc., 164 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Elizaga, 487 P.2d at 873) (noting that “nondisclosure of material facts can be a form of 
misrepresentation where the defendant has made representations which would be misleading 
without full disclosure”). 
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disclose, or affirmatively misrepresented, a foreseeable danger about which 
they had a duty to speak.  
In sum, fraud provides an avenue for survivors of #ChurchToo abuse to 
hold religious entities civilly accountable when their statements and actions 
misrepresent the safety of the organization or conceal or deny knowledge 
about the dangers of child sexual abuse therein. 
C. Vicarious Liability 
While familiar torts are helpful, advocates for victims should also push for 
more tools to hold religious organizations accountable for child sexual abuse. 
One such tool is vicarious liability. Although the traditional rule is that a 
principal cannot be vicariously liable for the intentional tort of an agent, 
some courts are inclined to expand the reaches of vicarious liability where the 
agent uses his position of trust to accomplish the child sexual abuse. 69 This 
type of expanded vicarious liability is particularly important where evidence 
of notice or knowledge (for negligence and fraud purposes) is controlled and 
concealed by the potentially liable organization. 
The policy considerations undergirding an expanded vicarious liability are 
several. First, courts have acknowledged that when an organization receives 
the benefits of the services of an agent, it should also bear the costs inflicted 
on others by that agent. Additionally, this type of strict liability also 
incentivizes organizations to supervise their agents more closely. Finally, 
when the proof requirements are met for vicarious liability, Courts have held 
that it is fairer for the organization to bear the shiftable (economic) burdens 
that flow from abuse to the principal—rather than the abused individual 
bearing all costs. 
The most robust example of this type of expanded vicarious liability being 
applied in child sexual abuse contexts can be found in the laws of the state of 
Oregon. 
1. Respondeat Superior: The Oregon Approach 
Oregon is unique in its decision to embrace the use of vicarious liability to 
hold organizations accountable for abuse that is inflicted by their employees 
and volunteers.70 Referred to as respondeat superior, Oregon allows a form of 
 
69.   Jennifer K. Weinhold, Beyond the Traditional Scope-of-Employment Analysis in the 
Clergy Sexual Abuse Context, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 531, 537–39 (2009). 
70.   Lourim v. Swensen, 977 P.2d 1157, 1160–61 (Or. 1999) (citing Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 
385 P.2d 611, 613 (Or. 1963) (“It is well established that one can be a servant even though the 
service is performed gratuitously.”).  
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“strict liability that imposes liability on a defendant without regard for the 
defendant’s fault.”71  
The policy rationale underlying Oregon’s version of respondeat superior is 
to consciously reallocate risk away from innocent parties and place it on those 
who benefit from actions ostensibly taken in their name: 
Respondeat superior is applied as a policy of risk allocation 
and the master benefits from the servants’ work. The master 
rather than the innocent plaintiff is better able to absorb and 
distribute the risk.72  
The key determination underlying whether a party is a principal’s agent for 
purposes of respondeat superior is whether the principal has the right to 
control the agent.73 In the abuse context, this is usually proven by showing 
that the employee or volunteer who was authorized by the church to build 
trust with children, used the authorized activities to groom the child for 
abuse, and then ultimately used the grooming to accomplish the abuse.  
Chesterman v. Barmon established Oregon’s modern test for respondeat 
superior.74 Under Chesterman, a principal is responsible for an agent’s 
harmful conduct when it results from acts that are “within the [agent’s] scope 
of employment.”75 As discussed below, a principal’s liability attaches under 
Chesterman even where the tortious conduct (including sexual abuse) was 
itself outside the formal agency of the tortfeasor.76  
The Oregon Supreme Court applied the rule from Chesterman to the 
context of child sexual abuse in two landmark companion cases: Fearing v. 
Bucher (involving child sexual abuse by a Catholic priest) and Lourim v. 
Swensen (involving child sexual abuse by a volunteer Boy Scout leader).77 
These cases established that a principal can be liable for sexual abuse 
 
71.   G.L. v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc., 757 P.2d 1347, 1348 (Or. 1988). 
72.   Farris v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 542 P.2d 1031, 1035 (Or. 1975) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
73.   Cain v. Rijken, 717 P.2d 140, 144 (Or. 1986) (“In determining whether the principal 
should be subject to vicarious liability for the acts of an agent, this court examines what control 
the principal exercises over the agent.”). 
74.   Chesterman v. Barmon, 753 P.2d 404, 406 (Or. 1988). 
75.   Id. 
76.   Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1166 n.4 (Or. 1999) (holding that because “an 
employee’s intentional tort rarely, if ever, will have been authorized expressly by the 
employer,” “it will virtually always be necessary to look to the acts that led to the injury to 
determine if those acts were within the scope of employment”) (emphasis added). 
77.   Id. at 1166; Lourim v. Swenson, 977 P.2d 1157, 1159–60 (Or. 1999).  
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committed by its agents where acts in the course and scope of employment 
“led to” or “resulted in” the abuse.78 
Fearing held that an employer may be liable for its employee’s intentional 
sexual abuse of a child where the performance of the employee’s job duties 
led to the abuse.79 In Fearing, the Court held that the allegations, taken as 
true, would satisfy all three Chesterman factors because: (1) the employee, a 
priest, used his position “to spend large periods of time alone with plaintiff,” 
and thereby to gain the opportunity “to touch him physically, and then to 
assault him sexually”; (2) the grooming behavior occurred “in connection 
with [the priest’s] employment as youth pastor and priest” (i.e., “within the 
time and space limitations of his employment”); and (3) in undertaking the 
grooming behavior, the priest was motivated by a desire, “at least partially 
and initially, to fulfill [the priest’s] employment duties”—and that these 
duties “generally were of a kind and nature that was required to perform as 
youth pastor and priest.”80  
Similarly, in Lourim, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts 
of America (and its local chapter) could be liable under respondeat superior 
for the sexual abuse of a minor by a volunteer scout leader.81 The Court in 
Lourim utilized an analysis nearly identical to that used in Fearing.82  
The complaint in Lourim alleged that the Boy Scout troop leader was a 
friend, guide, and mentor to the plaintiff.83 The complaint further alleged that 
the troop leader used his authority as troop leader to “socialize with the 
plaintiff,” to “spend time alone with him,” and to “gain the opportunity to 
touch him physically.”84 The court in Lourim held that if the allegations were 
taken as true, a jury could reasonably conclude that the abuser’s performance 
of duties as scout leader was a “necessary precursor” to the sexual abuse, and 
that the abuse was therefore “a direct outgrowth of” and “engendered by 
conduct that was within the scope of [the tortfeasor’s] employment.”85  
 
78.   See Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland in Or., 234 P.3d 990, 992 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) 
(citing Fearing, 977 P.2d at 1166) (“The court said that, although the sexual assaults themselves 
were outside the scope of Bucher’s employment, the archdiocese could still be found 
vicariously liable if acts that were within Bucher’s scope of employment resulted in the acts 
which led to the plaintiff’s injury.”).  
79.   Fearing, 977 P.2d at 1166–67.  
80.   Id. at 1166 (emphasis added). 
81.   Lourim, 977 P.2d at 1160. 
82.   Id. (“[T]he proper focus . . . [is] whether the complaint contained sufficient allegations 
of employee conduct that arguably resulted in the acts that led to plaintiff’s injury.”). 
83.   Id. at 1159. 
84.   Id. 
85.   Id. at 1160. 
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The foundation of both Fearing and Lourim is the rationale that in 
determining whether a principal is vicariously liable for an intentional tort 
by an agent, “it usually is inappropriate for the court to base its 
decision . . . on whether . . . the intentional tort itself was committed in 
furtherance of any interest of the employer or was of the same kind of 
activities that the employee was hired to perform.”86 Because such 
circumstances “rarely will occur and are not, in any event, necessary to 
vicarious liability,” the proper focus is on whether precursor conduct “within 
the scope” of the employee’s employment “resulted in the acts that caused the 
plaintiff’s injury.”87  
More recently, in another child sexual abuse case, Schmidt v. Archdiocese 
of Portland in Oregon, the Oregon Court of Appeals acknowledged that while 
“grooming” (meaning using a position of trust to accomplish abuse) would 
be “sufficient to establish the connection between the employment and the 
abuse,” grooming is not required. 88 Instead, under Oregon law, the 
“necessary employment connection [to support vicarious liability] is 
established by evidence that acts within the defendant’s employment resulted 
in the acts that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”89  
In sum, Oregon law has regularly recognized that a youth-serving 
organization can be vicariously liable for child sexual abuse by its agents. All 
the law requires is that some activity within the tortfeasor’s service “resulted 
in” or “led to” the tort. Oregon provides a roadmap for other states who wish 
to expand civil accountability for youth-serving organizations even in the 
absence of “smoking gun” evidence of negligence and fraud.90 
2. Other Jurisdictions  
While Oregon has the most robust body of case law supporting 
vicarious liability for child sexual abuse, there are some “glimmers of 
hope” in other jurisdictions that suggest that a similar approach may 
be viable elsewhere. For example, in Arizona, the Supreme Court 
considered a similar issue in a sexual harassment case and noted: 
     [I]n determining course and scope in a sexual harassment 
case, we must realize that employers never adopt resolutions 
 
86.   Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Or. 1999). 
87.   Id. (emphasis added). 
88.   Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland, 234 P.3d 990, 993 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). 
89.   Id. (citing Fearing, 977 P.2d. at 1166). 
90.   See, e.g., Ruling on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 
LACE119851 (Iowa Dist. Ct. May 14, 2012) (declining to dismiss an abuse case in an Iowa 
District Court and using the Oregon decisions as persuasive authority).  
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authorizing sexual harassment. Nor do they grant such 
authority in job descriptions or employment manuals 
. . . .  
Conduct within the scope of employment may be either of 
the same nature as that authorized or incidental to that 
authorized.91 
The court in Schallock looked beyond the job description to other factors, 
including but not limited to, when and where the conduct occurred, whether 
there was evidence that the employer was aware of inappropriate behavior 
and did not intervene to limit that behavior, whether the employer would 
have reason to expect that such an act might be done (i.e., an individual who 
engages in sexually harassing behavior would also sexually assault or rape), 
and whether the act, at least in part, was motivated by a purpose to serve the 
employer rather than to solely serve personal motives unconnected to the 
employer’s business.92 
The court went on to state that acts “may be found in the scope even if 
forbidden or done in a forbidden manner and even if consciously criminal or 
tortious.”93 Arizona’s position on an employer’s responsibility for criminal 
acts committed in the course and scope of employment was reaffirmed in 
Higgins v. Assmann Electronics, Inc., where the court stated: 
Although Meyer’s act was criminal, see Restatement § 
229(2)(j), Schallock held that ‘acts may be found in the scope 
even if forbidden or done in a forbidden manner, and even 
if consciously criminal or tortious.’ . . . ‘The question is 
whether at the time the injury occurred the employee was 
performing a service in furtherance of his employer’s 
business, not whether it was done in a manner exactly as the 
 
91.   State v. Schallock, 941 P.2d 1275, 1282 (1997) (emphasis added). 
92.   Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 229(1), 229(2)(c), 235 (AM. LAW INST. 
1958) (“Many factors are to be considered in determining whether conduct not expressly 
authorized is so incidental as to be within course and scope, including time and place of the 
conduct . . . . Another factor is the previous relation between master and servant . . . . A third 
relevant factor is whether ‘the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done’ . . . . 
[Another factor] is the purpose of the acts: to be within the course and scope, the act must be, 
at least in part, motivated by a purpose to serve the master rather than solely to serve personal 
motives unconnected to the master’s business. But here again, and particularly in a sexual 
harassment case, the act in question is not the ultimate tortious act but rather conduct related 
to the tort.”)). 
93.   Id. at 1284 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 230–31 (AM. LAW INST. 
1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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employer prescribed.’94 
Similarly, in Hardwicke v. American Boychoir School, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court expanded the scope of liability that a corporation has with 
regard to the conduct of its employees.95  Hardwicke involved allegations of 
child sexual abuse of a boarding school student by the school’s adult music 
director.96 The Court held that even if the conduct may have occurred outside 
the scope of the employee’s employment, the employer could be held 
vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the intentional 
conduct of its employees.97  
3. Other Agency-Based Liability Theories 
Even when the formal agency relationship under the respondeat superior 
doctrine is unavailable, other doctrines may be used to hold a religious 
organization vicariously liable. Such theories may include “apparent 
authority,” “agency by estoppel,” and “aided by agency.” 
As discussed below, some states are moving towards expanded vicarious 
liability under an “aided by agency” theory. The “aided by agency” theory is 
another way of recognizing that, where a perpetrator uses his position within 
the organization to accomplish the abuse, the organization bears some 
responsibility. Similarly, theories of “apparent agency,” “apparent authority,” 
and “agency by estoppel” also provide other avenues.  These are particularly 
appropriate where a large organization intentionally creates the impression 
that a church or perpetrator is “part” of the larger organization and then the 
latter tries to retroactively distance itself to avoid liability. 
a. Aided by agency 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219(2)(d) carves out an 
exception to the traditional vicarious liability scope-of-employment 
analysis.98 Under section 219(2)(d), a principal is vicariously liable for the 
acts of its employee, even if such acts fall outside the scope of employment, 
when (1) “the [agent] purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal 
and there was reliance upon apparent authority” (apparent authority), or (2) 
“[the agent] was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of 
 
94.   Higgins v. Assmann Elecs., Inc., 173 P.3d 453, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Ortiz 
v. Clinton, 928 P.2d 718, 723 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)) (internal citation omitted). 
95.   Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 902 A.2d 900, 911–13 (N.J. 2006). 
96.   Id. at 903. 
97.   Id. at 920.  
98.   See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).  
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the agency relation (aided by agency).”99 The United States Supreme Court 
has taken a broad view and recognized that this exception to the Restatement 
creates two distinct bases for liability—one based on apparent authority and 
the other based on the existence of the employer-employee relationship.100  
Under section 219(2)(d), a principal is held liable for the intentional tort 
of its employee if that employee was aided in accomplishing the tort by the 
existence of the agency relationship, regardless of whether the harm-causing 
activity fell within the scope of employment.101 This exception exists to 
address situations when it would be inequitable to deny a tort victim recovery 
against the tortfeasor’s employer, even if traditional principles of vicarious 
liability would not otherwise allow recovery. Generally, in jurisdictions that 
follow a broad interpretation of section 219(2)(d), the courts avoid the 
traditional respondeat superior analysis altogether and instead evaluate the 
principal's liability based on the degree to which the employment 
relationship facilitated the employee's intentional tort.102 The court then 
determines, based on the degree of relationship, whether imposing liability 
on the principal comports with the policy objectives that justify the 
imposition of vicarious liability.103  
 
99.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (emphasis 
added). 
100.   See Jennifer K. Weinhold, Beyond the Traditional Scope-of-Employment Analysis in 
the Clergy Sexual Abuse Context, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 531, 543 n. 63 (2009) (“Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801–02 (1998). The City, however, contends that § 
219(2)(d) has no application here. It argues that the second qualification of the subsection, 
referring to a servant ‘aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation,’ 
merely “refines” the one preceding it, which holds the employer vicariously liable for its 
servant’s abuse of apparent authority. But this narrow reading is untenable; it would render 
the second qualification of § 219(2)(d) almost entirely superfluous (and would seem to ask us 
to shut our eyes to the potential effects of supervisory authority, even when not explicitly 
invoked). The illustrations accompanying this subsection make clear that it covers not only 
cases involving the abuse of apparent authority, but also cases in which tortious conduct is 
made possible or facilitated by the existence of the actual agency relationship. See 
Restatement § 219, Comment e . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
101.   See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
102.   Weinhold, supra note 98, at 540–41.  
103.   See Mark E. Roszkowski & Christie L. Roszkowski, Making Sense of Respondeat 
Superior: An Integrated Approach for Both Negligent and Intentional Conduct, 14 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 235, 273 (2005). However, some courts are concerned that in a broad 
interpretation of aided by agency an employee is “always aided in accomplishing the tort by 
the existence of the agency relation because his responsibilities provide proximity to and 
contact with the victim.” Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995). As a result, some 
jurisdictions have narrowed the theory in two ways. First, an employer is “liable only if the tort 
was ‘accomplished by an instrumentality, or through conduct associated with the agency 
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There are a few examples of the successful application of these principals 
in similar contexts. In Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., the defendant 
corporation (a resort) was held vicariously liable for its manager’s torts when 
the manager raped a guest using his key card to access the guest’s room.104 
Costos stands for the proposition that employers should be vicariously liable 
for torts committed by employees outside the scope of their employment if 
those torts were committed by the authority which the employee’s job 
created.105 
Similarly, in Sherman v. State Dept. of Pub. Safety, the Delaware Supreme 
Court adopted the Aided by Agency doctrine in a case where the Plaintiff 
sued the State for assault, battery, and rape, arising out of an officer’s threat 
to have the arrestee incarcerated for shoplifting unless she engaged in sex 
with him.106 In so doing, the court noted that they took “into account the 
critical difference between police officers . . . and employees of most other 
businesses.”107 The question remains how such reasoning would apply to 
other special relationships (such as clergy-parishioner). 
To date, courts have adopted and applied the aided by agency theory 
inconsistently, if at all.108 Those who have adopted it differ in the scope of its 
application, limiting it to specific torts or specific principle/agent contexts 
 
status.’” Id. Second, the exception can only be used in instances of reliance or deceit. See 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998). 
104.   Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., 137 F.3d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1998). 
105.   Id. at 47–50. 
106.   Sherman v. State Dept. of Pub. Safety, 190 A.3d 148, 154–55 (Del. 2018). 
107.   Id. at 181.  
108.   The “aided by agency” or “aided in accomplishing” language did not appear in the 
common law until the Restatement (Second) of Agency promulgation of § 219(2)(d) in the 
1950s. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). The Restatement 
Second’s language is unclear, and courts have struggled with how broadly or narrowly to 
interpret the theory. Furthering the confusion, in 2006, the Restatement (Third) of Agency 
was produced and failed to adequately address the Restatement Second’s aided by agency 
language by neither adopting it nor refuting it. Instead, the Restatement Third provides a 
broad statement that the Restatement no longer needs the 219(2)(d) language because “[t]he 
purposes likely intended to be met by the ‘aided in accomplishing’ basis are satisfied by a more 
fully elaborated treatment of apparent authority and by the duty of reasonable care that a 
principal owes to third parties with whom it interacts through employees and other agents.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). Thus, jurisdictions that 
recognize the aided by agency doctrine typically follow the language of the Restatement 
Second and vary in its application. But see Doe v. Newbury Bible Church, 933 A.2d 196, 198 
(Vt. 2007) (Vermont Supreme Court held that a church is not subject to vicarious liability for 
the tortious acts of its pastor if the pastor was allegedly aided in accomplishing the tort by the 
existence of the agency relation with the church. Court distinguished a pastor from a police 
officer.) (citing Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48 (Vt. 2004)). 
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(i.e., police officer tortfeasors).109 Still, there appears to be opportunities in 
some jurisdictions for tenacious advocates to expand the opportunities for 
justice for victims of #ChurchToo abuse through these types of approaches. 
b. Apparent authority  
Section 2.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency defines “apparent 
authority” as “the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s 
legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the 
actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable 
to the principal’s manifestations.”110 Apparent authority, when present, 
trumps actual restrictions that the principal may have privately imposed on 
the agent. The question is whether it would reasonably appear to a third party 
that the principal has conferred authority on an agent. The rationale for 
imposing liability under apparent authority is so “[a] principal may not 
choose to act through agents whom it has clothed with the trappings of 
authority and then determine at a later time whether the consequence of their 
acts offers an advantage.”111  
Simiarly, “Agency by Estoppel” protects third parties who justifiably rely 
on a belief that an actor is an agent and act on that belief to their detriment.112 
The doctrine is applicable when the party against whom estoppel is asserted 
has made no “manifestation that an actor has authority as an agent,” but a 
third party believes that the actor is an agent and has “justifiably [been] 
induced” by that belief to undergo a “detrimental change in position.”113 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency does not distinguish between 
apparent authority and agency by estoppel.114 However, the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency expressly distinguishes apparent authority115 from agency 
by estoppel.116 Some practitioners struggle with utilizing the theories due to 
confusion flowing from the following factors: 1) a majority of courts use 
many of these terms (“ostensible agency,” “apparent agency,” “apparent 
authority,” and “agency by estoppel”)inconsistently or interchangeably; 2) 
the Restatements are unclear as to applicability to tort actions; and 3) when 
 
109.   See e.g., Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48 (Vt. 2004); Sherman, 190 A.3d 148 (Del. 2018). 
110.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
111.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006).  
112.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
113.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
114.   Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 206 P.3d 473, 480 (Idaho 2009). 
115.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
116.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
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analyzing these theories, some courts mix and match the standards found in 
different sections of the Restatement.117 Despite the confusion, these theories 
provide a potentially powerful tool in helping victims of abuse pursue civil 
justice against religious organizations.  
Jurisdictions that follow the Restatement (Second) have used the theory of 
agency by estoppel to hold defendants liable for abuse.118 In Bowman v. Home 
Life Insurance Co. of America, the plaintiffs applied for health insurance with 
the insurance company.119 The insurance company employed an underwriter 
who later impersonated a physician and performed an intimate examination 
on the plaintiffs.120 The court applied the apparent authority doctrine and 
found the insurance company liable for the torts of its underwriter.121 The 
court reasoned that by providing the underwriter with the information about 
the plaintiffs and the ability to ask them questions about their health, the 
insurance company provided him with apparent authority to gain access to a 
substantial amount of information.122 The court continued by stating, 
“Although he went further than his instructions indicated and committed the 
tort on the plaintiffs, this was a kind of deceit which was well within the 
insignia of office with which he had been clothed.”123 
Similarly, in Applewhite v. Baton Rouge, two law enforcement officers 
ordered the plaintiff to get into their car then forcibly raped her.124 The court 
reasoned that “where it is found that a law enforcement officer has abused 
the ‘apparent authority’ given such persons to act in the public interest, their 
employers have been required to respond in damages.”125 The approach from 
Applewhite and Bowman may provide avenues for victims of sexual abuse to 
 
117.   See RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 247–49, 253–64, 219(2)(d) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENTS 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (apparent authority), § 7.08 (principle liability in tort under 
apparent authority), § 2.05 (agency by estoppel) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).  
118.   Agency by estoppel is not expressly mentioned as a theory by which a principal can 
be held liable in tort. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY ch. 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). Agency 
by estoppel requires a “detrimental change of position” which is defined as “an expenditure of 
money or labor, an incurrence of a loss, or subjection to legal liability, not the loss of the benefit 
of a bargain.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
119.   Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of Am., 243 F.2d 331, 332 (3d Cir. 1957).  
120.   Id. at 333.  
121.   Id. at 334.  
122.   See id.  
123.   See id. 
124.   See Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge, 380 So. 2d 119, 120 (La. Ct. App. 1979). 
125.   Id. at 122. 
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impose vicarious liability on churches or denominations even where the 
necessary legal tests for agency of the perpetrator cannot be met. 
There are other efforts percolating among the cadre of lawyers who do this 
work to expand application of classic torts to obtain justice for victims of 
abuse, including public nuisance,126 civil conspiracy,127 and infliction of 
emotional distress.128 Others are pursuing novel theories, such as state RICO 
actions.129 Whatever the approach—revisiting “classic torts,” expanding 
existing law, or attempting novel theories—a foundational truth remains: 
#ChurchToo abuse survivors deserve the advocates’ best creativity, tenacity, 
and most zealous advocacy in seeking justice and making change.  
 
 
126.   Lisa Washington, Judge Allows Lawsuit Alleging Pittsburgh Diocese Created ‘Public 
Nuisance’, CBS PITTSBURGH (Jan. 9, 2020), https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2020/01/09/ 
pittsburgh-catholic-diocese-public-nuisance-lawsuit/. 
127.   Amanda Hoskins, Ruling Could Open Door for New Lawsuits in Clergy Sexual Abuse 
Cases, LOC. 21 NEWS (July 22, 2019), https://local21news.com/news/local/ruling-could-open-
door-for-new-lawsuits-in-clergy-sexual-abuse-cases. 
128.   In Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc., the 13-year-old plaintiff was 
drugged and raped by a 30-year-old church employee. 39 Cal. App. 5th 995, 998 (Cal App. 4th 
2019). When the plaintiff reported the abuse to her grandmother, Jan Crouch (an officer and 
Director of Trinity Christian Center), Crouch yelled at the girl, told her she was stupid, and 
that the rape was her fault. Id.  A jury found in favor of the plaintiff on a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Id.  The California Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict. 
Id.  The jury found in the plaintiff’s favor on her cause of action for IIED, reasoning: 
We do not hesitate to exclaim “Outrageous!” when presented with the 
facts of Jan Crouch's behavior toward Carra. Flying into a tirade at a 
13-year-old girl who had been drugged and raped and yelling at her 
that she was stupid and it was her fault is extreme and outrageous 
conduct that exceeds that bounds of decency tolerated in a civilized 
community. Such conduct is not mere insults, indignities, petty 
oppressions or other trivialities. At age 13, Carra suffered a horrible, 
traumatic, and life-altering experience. Yelling at her that she was 
stupid and it was her fault was cruel, intolerable, and obviously certain 
to produce severe emotional harm.  
Id. at 1007-08. 
129.   Joseph O’Brien, What We Need to Know About RICO, NAT’L CATH. REG. (Aug. 27, 
2019), http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/what-we-need-to-know-about-rico (“On Aug. 
14, 22 plaintiffs filed a federal RICO suit against the Diocese of Buffalo, the Society of Jesus, 
parishes, high schools and others for an alleged ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ that allowed 
for and hid clerical sexual abuse.”). 
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IV. PART III: ANOTHER PATH FORWARD? 
Despite the epidemic of child sexual abuse in Protestant religious 
organizations, some devout Christians take issue with the use of the civil 
justice system as an agent of change for the church. Earlier in my career, I 
was much more sensitive to these views. More than a decade later, I have seen 
many situations where churches and religious organizations are among the 
worst offenders, either in allowing abuse or revictimizing survivors in how 
they response to abuse disclosures. Two examples illustrate this point. 
In the first example, I worked on a group of cases where a church selected 
a youth leader knowing he had just been released from prison for child 
molestation. The Church then turned a blind eye to obvious warning signs 
and reports of concerns over the course of a decade while he abused dozens 
of boys.130 In the face of such callous disregard, it is unreasonable to expect 
abuse survivors to forgo litigation, and instead, put their trust in the very 
institution that knowingly allowed their torment, in hopes that it will 
voluntarily take appropriate action. 
I have also observed many situations where churches and religious 
organizations have failed to demonstrate any compassion in responding to 
victims who come forward seeking answers and acknowledgement. As a 
second example, I currently have a case131 where the Church allowed an adult, 
who they knew was accused of abuse, to continue to participate in the youth 
group. Later, he abused multiple minor girls—including my client. After 
years of suffering, my client was finally ready and able to address what 
happened. My client earnestly desired a peaceful resolution: give the church 
an opportunity to avoid litigation by making protective policy changes and 
compensating her for the value of past and future treatment costs. With those 
instructions, I sent a letter offering to resolve the case, without filing a lawsuit, 
if the church would agree to those terms. It was a generous offer, but it was 
important to my client that the church have the opportunity to do the right 
thing. The response? A letter, not from church leadership, but from the 
church’s insurance company denying all liability and implying that my client 
and others were lying about what had happened. In the face of such a 
response, a civil lawsuit is the victim’s only effective alternative to giving up 
and going away quietly.  
 
130.   Aimee Green, Lawsuit Accuses Seventh-day Adventist Church in 1970s of Supporting 
Convicted Child Molester’s Habit, OREGONIAN (Aug. 26, 2014), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2014/08/lawuit_accuses_seventh_day_adv.html.  
131.   Given that this example is currently in litigation, I am withholding identifying 
information. 
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Given the pervasiveness of these types of attitudes and actions by religious 
organizations confronted with abuse from within, most survivors and 
advocates find civil justice to be the only viable path available. If it takes the 
“hammer” of civil litigation to accomplish this change, so be it.  
There may be another path—a “third way” forward—that can make civil 
litigation unnecessary. It is not complicated, but it is a narrow path. And only 
religious organizations themselves can choose to follow it. Such an alternative 
requires that the religious organization voluntarily and proactively: 
• Accept responsibility for abuse that is inflicted by religious 
leaders or in the church context; 
• Seek out and humbly listen to victims—hearing them, 
seeking understanding, and embracing the truth they 
share;132 
• Sharing the organizations secrets about abuse, including the 
documents and information kept by the organization about 
the perpetrator, information learned by the organization, 
and the organization’s response; 
• Repent and lament as an organization for the entity’s role in 
allowing abuse;  
• Choosing not to rely on technical affirmative defenses like 
the statute of limitations. (This is essential because the 
organization cannot coherently affirm the unending pain 
and suffering the victims suffer and at the same time tell 
them they are undeserving of redress—or the church’s 
culpability is immaterial—because the victim “waited too 
long.”); 
• Proactively seek out and make meaningful amends to 
victims (including individual compensation) instead of 
waiting for victims to come forward with demands; and, 
 
132.   For a discussion on the supportive role that clergy can play in assisting 
victims with making healthy disclosures see, Victor I. Veith et al, Keeping Faith: The 
Potential Role of a Chaplain to Address the Spiritual Needs of Maltreated Children 
and Advise Child Abuse Multi-Disciplinary Teams, 14 LIBERTY UNIV. L. REV. 351, 
370–71 (2020). 
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• Embrace a culture of child protection as a top priority—
going the extra mile to do everything reasonably possible to 
protect against future abuse. 
Following this path requires conviction, a willingness to act out of courage, 
and a prioritization of the wellbeing of victims over the rights of the 
institution. In following this path, motivations matter and cannot be “faked” 
or “mimicked” as a defensive ploy. 133 To succeed, this approach must flow 
from an attitude of genuine care and concern for victims. While this 
alternative can be effective, “the gate is narrow and the way is hard . . . and 
those who find it are few.”134 
V. CONCLUSION 
We can and should hope and pray for the day when religious organizations 
will voluntarily adopt a “third way” approach to reconciliation with 
#ChurchToo abuse survivors. However, the grave and long-standing 
consequences of wide-spread child sexual abuse in the Protestant world 
mandates action now. We cannot wait for the Protestant Church to “get 
religion.” Until that day arrives, the aims of helping victims heal and 
eradicating #ChurchToo abuse requires that we utilize all available effective 
tools. And civil lawsuits against religious organizations are among the most 
effective tools available for survivors and their advocates. 
 
133.   “Forgiving and being reconciled to our enemies or our loved ones are not about 
pretending that things are other than they are. It is not about patting one another on the back 
and turning a blind eye to the wrong. True reconciliation exposes the awfulness, the abuse, the 
pain, the hurt, the truth. It could even sometimes make things worse. It is a risky undertaking, 
but in the end it is worthwhile, because in the end only an honest confrontation with reality 
can bring real healing. Superficial reconciliation can bring only superficial healing.” Desmond 
Tutu, Truth and Reconciliation, GREATER GOOD MAG. (Sept. 1, 2004), 
https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/truth_and_reconciliation.  
134.   Matthew 7:14 (English Standard Version) (emphasis added). 
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